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Nobody would deny the significance of narrowing the development gap
among member countries of ASEAN for its regional integration. At the
ASEAN Summit held in Singapore in November 2007, for example, the
ASEAN leaders recognised that “the need to ensure the deepening and
broadening integration of ASEAN is accompanied by technical and
development cooperation to address the development divide and accelerate
the economic integration of the less developed ASEAN Member
Countries.”() The need to narrow the development gap has been
repeatedly mentioned in past ASEAN documents() and its commitment of
establishing an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2015 strength-
ened the need more than ever().
On the other hand, for the less developed members, Cambodia, Laos,
Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV), the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS)
programme, launched by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1992, is
already widely known as their main vehicle of cross-border development
cooperation(). This GMS programme, covering wide range of infrastruc-
tures from ʻhardʼ to ʻsoftʼ, even comprises two provinces in southern China
(Yunnan and Guangxi) in addition to five countries of peninsular Southeast
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Asia (Thailand and CLMV) (). Its aim is neither political nor security, but
solely economic cooperation. In its process, many levels of ministerial
meetings have already been institutionalised and even the first meeting of
GMS Summit was organised in 2002. This implies a birth of a new region
which differs from any other perceived regions.
As Oliver Hensengerth has pointed out, GMS today is an institution
representing a state-centric international system, while it enables an
institution to emerge which functions as a platform for subnational units as
well as transnational actors. The post-Cold War region has not yet found a
final security arrangement, and sees regional and non-regional powers
competing for influence(). Especially noteworthy is, that, from a strategic
point of view, China has been given an indispensable position in GMS and
has deepened its engagement with it. The GMS programme may expand
economic as well as institutional linkage between China and peninsular
Southeast Asian countries. GMS is thus becoming a new region in which
China plays a key role.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the process of the GMS
programme and its possible impact on ASEAN regional integration. The
expanding economic linkage between China and the peninsular Southeast
Asia, together with its influence upon future order of the region will be
discussed, and, in order to maintain a credible regional identity, necessity
for closer cooperation among ASEAN countries will be emphasised.
Roots of the Cross-Border Cooperation
In March 1992, five months after the conclusion of the Cambodian Peace
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Accord in Paris, ADB invited the representatives of China, Myanmar, Laos,
Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam to the head office in Manila, and proposed
to put feasibility study concerning cross-border economic cooperation into
practice. In October of the same year, the first ministerial meeting of the
six countries was held, in order to discuss outcome of the study. Through
this discussion, the representatives of the six countries came to an
agreement: to promote economic cooperation in six fields, transport,
telecommunications, energy, environment, human resource development,
trade and investment, and to name the region involved in this cooperation
GMS.
The GMS programme was not made up overnight. According to
Noritada Morita, an ADB senior official who took part in organising this
programme, roots of the GMS programme can be traced back to October
1987, when ADB decided to assist in constructing hydroelectric power
plant in Xeset(). Xeset is a tributary of the Mekong River, running
through southern Laos. At the waterfall in its midstream investigation
concerning hydroelectric power plant had begun in the 1980s with Norwayʼs
assistance. This power plant was to fulfil the electricity demand in southern
Laos, as well as to secure Laosʼ source of hard currency by transmitting all
remaining electricity to Thailand. However, due to escalation of Cambodian
conflict, collapse of this power plant conception was unavoidable. Lao-Thai
relations had deteriorated and armed clashes frequently broke out in
border area.
ADBʼs policy of positive engagement in Laos was a factor back-ground-
ing its leading role in putting once again the collapsed conception into
practice. ADB had considered Laos to be the only one in the three
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Indochinese countries, which would show interest in collaborating with the
West. To construct power plant in Laos and to transmit electricity to
Thailand should become common benefit of both countries, and this
common benefit should be promoted, especially when government level of
relations between the two countries were strained().
It would have been impossible for ADB to set this project forward, if
there had been no sign of improvement in Lao-Thai relations at that time.
However, both countries were then positive in starting political talks, and
their positive relations were also supported by Hanoi(10). Hanoi expected
that Laos would open its windows facing Thailand under circumstances,
such as, economic difficulties of the three Indochina countries, decline of the
Soviet Union and increasing penetration of commodity goods from
Thailand.
Moreover, the fact, that legacy of Mekong Committee existed between
Laos and Thailand, is also important. The Mekong Committee, organised in
1957 following advice of Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
(ECAFE), made steady efforts in controlling and using Mekong river
system, until it stopped to function in the second half of 1970s. Namngum
Hydro Electric Power Plant, constructed in north of Vientiane in 1971, was
one of its legacies. From Namngum Power Plant electricity had still been
transmitted to Thailand even in 1980s through efforts made by Laos-side,
and payments from Thai-side had never been left unpaid. There was
certain credibility among electric power staffs of the two countries, and this
credibility was the base for the ADBʼs new project. It was in September
1987, when Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) signed
the agreement upon purchasing electricity from the planned power plant in
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Xeset(11).
Xeset Power Plant was inaugurated in November 1991. In the process of
its construction, building materials had been sabotaged some times at Thai
border, and such difficulties had been overcome through efforts of the
electric power staff in both countries. Most of its forty-five thousand kw/h
electricity is transmitted to Thailand, which is to fulfil a part of Thailandʼs
increasing electricity demand, and to be an important source of hard
currency for Laos. ADB has thus succeeded in embodying potential
common benefit between Laos and Thailand, through its assistance in
constructing Xeset Power Plant.
Evolution of the GMS Programme
The GMS programme was launched by ADB, which, after making efforts
in developing the project in Xeset, had geographically and functionally
extended areas of economic cooperation. Since the ʻwindowsʼ of Laos were
opened, extending the effect to Cambodia and Vietnam was taken for
granted. Considering Thailand as a main local partner in regional
development was a natural extension of Xeset experiences. However,
economic cooperation which ADB strived for, not only included Thailand
and the three Indochina countries, but also had Myanmar and China in its
scope. In order to increase importance of the economic cooperation, link
with China was thought to be inevitable(12). At first, Yunnan Province was
targeted, and in 2004 Guangxi Autonomous Region was also included in the
GMS programme.
Four factors which enabled to start the GMS programme could be
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pointed out. First of all is Thailandʼs change in regional policies. Chatchai
Chunhawan who became the prime minister of Thailand in 1988 was eager
to expand economic relations with neighbouring countries under the
slogan： ʻturn Indochina from a battlefield into a marketplace.ʼ Bangkok
had begun to seek economic hinterland for further developments in Thai
economy(13). Second factor is a tendency towards economic liberalisation in
Asia. Morita spoke in Bangkok, on his way back from the inauguration of
Xeset power plant in November 1991, as follows： “economic liberalisation
taking place in Southeast Asia is opening a new dimension for expanding
economic cooperation.”(14) Third is the ceasefire in Cambodia. Although the
total lift of the United States embargo against Vietnam took place only in
1994, a delay of political settlement in Cambodia might have increased
obstacles against the GMS programme. Finally, active commitment of
China, especially that of the provincial government of Yunnan can be
mentioned. Regarding increasing economic gap between coastal and inland
areas in China, the provincial government aims to “open door of Yunnan to
Southeast Asia”, and this idea came to be recognised and supported by the
central government(15).
The GMS programme has two characteristics. One is its strict respect
for recipientʼ s ownership. The GMS programme is the six member
countriesʼ project, and ADB as a host is to function as an intermediary
between its members or donors. Another is its pragmatic and results-ori-
ented principle. The GMS programme does not strive for six member
countriesʼ common consent. Development cooperation can be put into
practice, if more than two countries have agreed, and it is also possible for
other countries to join afterwards. Moreover, the GMS programme does
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not stick to preparing official documents, but respects to accumulate de
facto agreements, such as in form of chairpersonʼ s summary. These
characteristics can be considered as methods adequate for development
cooperation directing areas of striking diversity, and within these
characteristics one is to see the fundamental reason for the GMS being able
to be the main vehicle(16).
The GMS programme is administred by ministerial meetings, organized
by prime ministerʼs office of each country, representatives of financial and
economic planning branch, as well as working groupsʼ meetings, organised
by practical persons in governmental offices placed for each professional
field. Since its foundation in 1992, the GMS programme has held, in addition
to annual ministerial meetings, working groups a few times a year.
Furthermore, in November 2002, its tenth anniversary, six member
countriesʼ first summit meeting was held in Phnom Penh(17).
Key project of the GMS programme has been construction of
cross-border traffic networks, such as North-South Economic Corridor
(NSEC), East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC) and Southern Economic
Corridor (SEC), as well as economic development along the corridors. This
project is expected to remove physical and non-physical barriers and
integrate the subregion.
ASEAN and the GMS Programme
What would the development of the GMS programme mean for
ASEAN？ In some points it has benefited ASEAN. Possibility of market
expansion can be mentioned as a first point. The programme plays an
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important role in CLMV countries in developing infrastructure or human
resources, so that these countries can function fully as a market. In addition,
peninsular Southeast Asia has the possibility to function as a gateway to
Chinese market.
Secondly, the development of the GMS programme has partly supported
ASEANʼs enlargement. In 1992, when the programme started, Vietnam
and Laos solely attended the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) as
observers, and formation of ASEAN-10 seemed to be far off. In this
situation, the ministerial meetings of the GMS programme, where
representatives of all the peninsular countries sat together, seemed to help
former adversaries of the Cambodian conflict build confidence. The
ASEAN-10 was formed in 1999 with Cambodiaʼ s joining as a full
member(18).
Enlargement of ASEAN would strengthen its bargaining power in wider
range of international relations, as well as make the ASEAN Free Trade
Area (AFTA) more attractive. At the same time, however, enlargement
led to a new problem of polarisation within ASEAN itself. Polarisation can
be observed in many fields, and one example is that seen in levels of
economic development. The development gap between older and newer
members needs to be narrowed, which now has become ASEANʼs own
agenda.
Indeed, ASEAN sought to take its own initiative by embarking ASEAN
Mekong Basin Development Cooperation (AMBDC) with a lead of
Singapore and Malaysia. The first ministerial meeting of AMBDC was held
in June 1996, with participation of ten Southeast Asian countries plus China,
bigger than the GMS programme in its size. AMBDCʼs main project is to
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construct Singapore-Kunming Rail Link (SKRL), a grand scheme that
integrates GMS and archipelagic Southeast Asia.
However, AMBDCʼs later progress has not been satisfactory. Meetings
are held intermittently, as if to save face of its main advocators. As a reason
for this unsatisfactory progress of AMBDC, lack of funds can be mentioned.
At the time when AMBDC embarked, just one year before Asian financial
crisis broke out, ASEAN economies were booming and ʻASEAN optimismʼ
was most uplifted. Within ASEAN even a plan existed, to have the SKRL
connected to Europe, and proposal of this plan was made in the year, when
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process started(19). Asian financial crisis of
1997-1998, however, heavily damaged this plan. Japanʼs participation as an
observer was cancelled by the ASEAN side, just before the first ministerial
meeting of AMBDC. Reason of this abandonment is not quite clear, but,
according to one explanation, it was due to dissent expressed by China(20).
More fundamental obstacle to AMBDC was reluctance of some
members to give CLMV countries the priority to develop. Indeed, countries
which would gain profit directly from the SKRL are Malaysia and
Singapore, whereas Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei cannot expect
such profit. Malaysia and Singapore which, through trade and investment,
already have closer connection to Indochina, are more eager to cooperate
with AMBDC than the other three countries. An eagerness gap can be
clearly recognised within the archipelagic countries, and the gap seemed to
have become bigger after the Asian financial crisis broke out.
Unsatisfactory progress of AMBDC is thus a problem of ASEAN itself,
which has not been caused directly by the GMS programme. Still, this has
given the impression that ASEAN is unable to take initiative in
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development of its newer members. This impression might have been
strengthened even more by the Chinaʼs proposal of ASEAN-China Free
Trade Area (ACFTA) . If ACFTA would be extensively put into practice,
all the ASEAN countries would be provided with rich business chance in
Chinese market, and that, as a result, the importance of the peninsular
Southeast Asia as a gateway to Chinese market would be decreased.
Later in November 2000, the ASEAN Summit held in Singapore came to
an agreement to promote the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI)
proposed by Singapore. Conception of IAI is that, developed countries
within ASEAN support that of underdeveloped in fields of infrastructure,
human resource development, information and telecommunication technol-
ogy, and capacity building for regional economic integration(21). At the core
of this conception lay Singaporeʼs expectation to strengthen its link to the
CLMV countries by means of Information Technology (IT), its strong
point.
IAI, however, has won far less recognition than the GMS programme,
although it, differing from the case of AMBDC, seeks to gain support
especially from China, Japan and Korea. Manifestation made at ASEAN
Summit, ASEAN＋ 3 Summit and ASEAN-China Summit, held in Phnom
Penh just before the first GMS Summit in 2003, is noticeable：
“Collaboration with the Greater Mekong Subregion programme to
accelerate ASEAN integration”(22). This would mean that ASEAN has
officially acknowledged the leading role of the GMS programme.
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GMS and Greater China
As stated earlier, key project of the GMS programme has been
construction of cross-border traffic networks, and, among them, EWEC,
connecting central Vietnam and north-eastern Thailand, has been given
top priority. This is because ADB regards strengthening of east-west axis
very important for balanced development of GMS(23). However, what
seems to be most expanding within GMS is, nevertheless, north-south axis
which connects China with countries such as Vietnam, Thailand or
Myanmar. As stated earlier, Yunnan Province is actively expanding its
economic relations with peninsular Southeast Asia. There is also a growing
tendency to develop Kunming, just like Bangkok, to the hub city of GMS.
Moreover it is noticeable, that since the middle of 1990s commitment of
the Chinese central government to the GMS Programme has remarkably
increased. This is apparent, if one looks to the Chinese representative in the
ministerial meetings. At the initial stage it was officials of relatively lower
rank in the central government, and people who actually took part in
discussion were officials from Yunnan provincial government. However,
since the ministerial meeting held in 1995, the central government has
begun to dispatch officials of higher rank. A deputy prime minister of the
third rank was present at the ministerial meeting held in Yunnan Province
in the following year. Then in 2002, the prime minister Zhu Rongji
participated in the first summit, which fully appealed, domestically and
internationally, Chinaʼs active commitment to the GMS programme.
This growing commitment of China to the GMS programme may turn
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out to economic advantage of, not only China, but also peninsular Southeast
Asian countries. Since economic exchange in GMS cannot be one-way.
Within Thai business circle, NSEC is actually not a little expected to be
maintained for expansion of business chance in Chinese market. Vietnam is
also in the same expectation. On the other hand, among these countries,
importance of cooperation with developed countries, such as Japan or USA,
has come to be more recognised, in order not to be overwhelmed by China
in competitiveness. Therefore, growth of economic exchange with China
may also give countries like Thailand or Vietnam opportunities for
economic development, which will probably be promoted with multilaterali-
sation of economic relations. Moreover, peninsular Southeast Asian
countries are also concerned about strengthening east-west axis(24). If
construction of SEC would actually start, potential of Thailand, Cambodia
and Vietnam would surely be more and more stimulated.
However, Chinaʼs influence upon peninsular Southeast Asian countries
cannot be underestimated. First of all, China has geographical advantage in
border trade with these countries. But also with its a few times as large
population than that of the whole ASEAN-10, as well as its high rates of
economic growth, continuing more than two decades, China is perhaps
implanting in its smaller neighbours, rather exaggerated image of growing
economy(25). Ross H Munro argued in 1994 that： “neighbouring countries
eager for the fruits of Chinaʼ s economic takeoff sometimes seen more
enthusiastic than China itself”(26). This argument seems to be still plausible.
Moreover, China itself has reasons to be concerned about circumstances
in its southern flank, since adversaries had historically utilised the border
area for ethnical or ideological subversion against China(27). Also,
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peninsular Southeast Asia links China with strategic waterways in the
South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. China is expanding diplomatic and
military ties with peninsular Southeast Asian countries. China has moved
to establish military-to-military contacts with these countries, whereas
acceleration of military build up within itself is an attempt to make them
unable to rely on military force against Chinaʼs economic expansionism(28).
This would be a modern version of “to prevail without fighting” (Sun Tzuʼs
Art of War) .
Yet, future China may not be easily foreseen, and a despotic China,
strongly affecting neighbouring countries with its mighty national power,
cannot be the only outcome. In the longer term, China could be politically
destabilised. Widening economic gap and uneven development among
provinces and social strata, caused by its rapid economic growth, could lead
to strong resistance to and weakening of the Beijingʼs control. As a result,
Chinaʼs political system may turn out to be more pluralistic in future. As
Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver mentioned, “the chance of China fragmenting,
or undergoing prolonged political and economic turbulence, seemed just as
great as the chance of its emerging as an Asian or global great power”(29).
In the former case, GMS would function as a sort of shock absorber
between China and Southeast Asia, and for regional security, role of
prosperous and stable Yunnan and Guanxi would become more important.
At this moment, however, China is still despotic, and, even if certain
pluralisation would take place in future, it may appear as unified entity
based on its emerging nation-wide economy. In this case, China would
become a type of empire, controlling its smaller neighbours with
combination of diplomatic, economic, and non-coercive measures, and
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ʻpeaceʼ may be brought to GMS, as a result of certain areas in peninsular
Southeast Asia being incorporated into Greater Chinaʼs sphere of influence.
Such an outcome would certainly not be favourable to ASEAN, and in order
to avoid it, ASEAN will have to contribute more vigorously to a credible
regional identity. ASEAN should initiate positive development cooperation
for the newer members, and realisation of ASEAN Economic Community
should not be in far future(30).
注
（） This chapter is a revised and expanded version of a paper presented at the 5th
Japan-Vietnam Dialogue, held in Haiphong in September 2009, co-organised by
The Japan Institute of International Affairs and Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.
（） ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint adopted at the ASEAN Summit held
in Singapore, November 2007, p.31.
（） For example, ASEAN Vision 2020 (ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur,
December 1997) ; Hanoi Plan of Action (ASEAN Summit in Hanoi, December
1998) ; Bali Concord II (ASEAN Summit in Bali, October 2003), and Cebu
Declaration (ASEAN Summit in Cebu, January 2007).
（） Vo Tri Thanh, “ASEAN Economic Community: Perspective from ASEANʼs
Transitional Economy”, in Roadmap to an ASEAN Economic Community edited
by Denis Hew, Singapore： Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005, pp.105-126.
（） Jörn Dosch and Oliver Hensengerth, “Sub-Regional Cooperation in Southeast
Asia: The Mekong Basin,” European Journal of East Asian Studies, volume 4 no 2
(2005) ; Kao Kim Hourn and Jeffrey A Kaplan eds., The Greater Mekong
Subregion and ASEAN: From Backwaters to Headwaters, Phnom Penh:
Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, 2000; Kao Kim Horun and
Sisowath D Chanto, “The Greater Mekong Subregion: An ASEAN Issue,” in
Reinventing ASEAN, edited by Simon S C Tay, Jesus P Estanislao and Hadi
Soesastro, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001; Masaya Shiraishi,
“Posto-reisenki indishina-ken no chiiki kyouryoku” [Regional Cooperation in Post
Cold War Indochina], in Betonamu to tai [Vietnam and Thailand], edited by Keizo
Isobe, Tokyo: Taimeido, 1998; ”Takayuki Ogasawara, “Mekon chiiki kaihatsu wo
14 法学論集 68 〔山梨学院大学〕
― 447 ―
meguru kokusai kankei to asean” [ASEAN and International Dimensions of
Mekong Region Development], in Higshi ajia chiiki shugi to nippon gaiko [East
Asian Regionalism and Japan], edited by Susumu Yamakage, Tokyo: The Japan
Institute of International Affairs, 2003; Milton Osborne, “The Strategic
Significance of the Mekong,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, volume 22 no 3
(2000) .
（） In this paper, author uses the term ʻpeninsular Southeast Asiaʼ instead of
ʻmainland Southeast Asiaʼ. This terminology reflects authorʼs stand that whole
Southeast Asia should be treated as a distinct region rather than an edge of Asian
mainland. The author has benefited from useful insights on this point from
Gungwe Wang, “Two Perspectives of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore and
China,” in Locating Southeast Asia: Geographies of Knowledge and Politics of
Space, edited by Paul H Kratoska, Remco Raben and Henk Shulte Nordholt,
Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005.
（） Oliver Hensengerth, Regionalism in China-Vietnam Relations: Institution-
Building in the Greater Mekong Subregion, London and New York: Routledge,
2010.
（） Authorʼs Interview with Noritada Morita, Bangkok, 31 August 2004.
（） Ibid.
（10） See Political Report presented at Sixth Congress of Communist Party of
Vietnam, December 1986.
（11） The Nation, 25 September 1987.
（12） Authorʼs Interview with Morita.
（13） Thailand also collaborated with China in Quadrangle Development (China,
Thailand, Myanmar and Laos) started in 1993 and supported Japan in Forum for
Comprehensive Development Initiative (Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam)
proposed by prime minister Kiichi Miyazawa in 1993.
（14） He further pointed out factors which would accelerate such process：
“economic cooperation in Asia was being facilitated by a marked increase in
intra-regional trade”， “the acceleration of direct private foreign investment
among Asian countries with much of funds coming from the newly regional
industrialising economies and Japan”， “a narrowing of differences in the rates of
growth between subregions in Asia had helped reduce trade imbalance and
enhance intra-regional trade” and “the emergence of a more ʻmulti-layered
structureʼ in the regional economy had provided an added push for the transfer of
Emergence of Greater Mekong Subregion：Its Impact on ASEAN Regional Integration 15
― 446 ―
capital and technology.” See The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 7
November 1991.
（15） Authorʼs Interview with Zhu Zhenming, Vice Director, Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, Kunming, 4 September 2004.
（16） Asian Development Bank, Economic Cooperation in the Greater Mekong
Subregion, 2002, p.2; Kazu Sakai, “Economic Cooperation in the Greater Mekong
Subregion,” in The Greater Mekong Subregion and ASEAN, pp.18-19.
（17） Second meeting of the GMS Summit was held in Kunming in July 2005.
（18） Vietnam joined in 1995. Laos and Myanmar joined in 1997.
（19） First meeting of ASEM was held in Bangkok in March 1996.
（20） See Keisuke Nomoto, “Mekon chiiki kaihatsu wo meguru chiiki kyoryoku no
genjo to tenbo [Regional cooperation in Mekong regional development]”,
Kaihatsu kinyu keisai kenkyusho ho [Journal of Research Institute for
Development and Finance], no 12 (2002), p.62.
（21） Press Statement by Chairman, 4th ASEAN Informal Summit, Singapore, 25
November 2000. ASEAN Secretariat, “Bridging the Development Gap among
Members of ASEAN” at http://www.aseansec.org/18201.htm
（22） Press Statement by the Chairman of the 8th ASEAN Summit, the 6th ASEAN＋
3 Summit and the ASEAN-China Summit, Phnom Penh, 4 November 2002. Joint
GMS Summit Decralation, “Making it Happen: A Common Strategy on
Cooperation for Growth, Equity and Prosperity in the Greater Mekong
Subregion,” Phnom Penh, 4 November 2002.
（23） Authorʼ s Interview with Tsuneaki Yoshida, professor at the University of
Tokyo and a former ADB official, Tokyo, 25 July 2004.
（24） At the ASEAN Summit held in Hanoi in December 1998, necessity for
cooperation in developing West-East Corridor (WEC) was raised by Vietnam
and was approved as an ASEAN project. WEC conception is to contribute to
equitable development in the GMS, through poverty reduction in areas from
central Vietnam to north-eastern Thailand. Thai prime minister, Thaksin
Shinawatra, on the other hand, proposed in April 2003, The Ayeyawady-Chao
Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS), initially targeting
four countries, Thailand, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. In November of the same
year its first summit meeting was held. This ACMECS conception has its point in
further promoting division of labour among the four countries, and Thailand itself
has proclaimed to take steps for tariff reduction or contracted import. Vietnam
16 法学論集 68 〔山梨学院大学〕
― 445 ―
was also invited to join ACMECS after the first summit meeting.
（25） S D Muni, China's Strategic Engagement with the New ASEAN, Singapore:
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2002, chapter 4; Nguyen Thi Dieu, The
Mekong River and the Struggle for Indochina, Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999,
p.227.
（26） Ross H Munro, “The Asian Interior： Chinaʼs Waxing Spheres of Interests”,
Orbis, volume 38 no 4 (1994), pp.10-11.
（27） For example, USA, during 1950s and 1960s, contacted ethnic forces in
Myanmar, northern Laos and northern Vietnam, as well as former Kuomintang
troops remained in Myanmar, with aim to contain China and its perceived
surrogate, North Vietnam.
（28） Ibid.; Muni, China's Strategic Engagement with the New ASEAN, chapter 4.
（29） Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of
International Security, Cambridge： Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp.
147-148.
（30） Japan is also expected to play active roles for this goal. Takayuki Ogasawara,
“Asean nisouka mondai to nippon: mekon chiiki kaihatsu heno torikumi”
[Overcoming the ASEAN Divide: Japanʼ s Tackling for the Mekong Region
Development], in Asean saikasseika heno kadai [Agendas for Revitalisation of
ASEAN], edited by Yoneji Kuroyanagi, Tokyo： Akashi shoten, 2011.
Emergence of Greater Mekong Subregion：Its Impact on ASEAN Regional Integration 17
― 444 ―
